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Defining a genre in literature is not an easy task; throughout history there have been 
many debates about what makes tragedy tragic, or when a work of art is baroque 
and when it’s rococo and so forth. In videogames, albeit their specificities, the 
problem is similar. In this article we will try to define the NES platform game and 
through this process, hopefully, shed some light on the question of how to define 
videogame genres. We also maintain that such a process can have very practical 
benefits since it allows us to think “outside the box”, that is, to consider new 
possibilities of game design beyond fixed genre settings. We will purposely analyze 
some very canonical games of a popular genre (the platform game) in a now classic 
platform (the 8-bit Nintendo Entertainment System), in order to show that, to some 
extent, what we consider an unquestionable genre has actually a very interesting 
dialectical contradiction at its core. This contradiction can be relevant if we want to 
think about the role of game developing inside the culture industry, something which 
definitely does not arise spontaneously from the masses (Adorno 2001); that is to 
say: the genres we are used to playing in videogames are not something “natural”. In 
other words, to naturalize something which is socially constructed or to believe that 
something historical is eternal is a process of reification; this article’s purpose, then, 
could be said to be that of questioning reification in videogames when it comes to 
game genres. 
Ways of defining a genre can be roughly divided into two approaches: the deductive 
and the inductive. Translating the problem into our case study, we could put it this 
way: do we play all the NES platform games and then try to develop a definition from 
them or do we first elaborate a definition and try to apply them to all the empirical 
cases? It is, of course, a very grosso modo way of summing things up, but it is a 
good way of introducing the methodological problem since in this paper we will try to 
approach this from a admittedly dialectical way of reasoning. 
The properly dialectical way of defining a genre is to select extreme cases from that 
genre and then analyze them as constitutive of it. There is nothing exotic about this 
methodological maneuver, it is basically a way of forming a concept. “The general is 
the idea. The empirical, on the other hand, can be all the more profoundly 
understood the more clearly it is seen as an extreme. The concept has its root in the 
extreme.” (Benjamin 2003, p.35). 
With this paper we will define the NES platform game as a genre. The extremes 
taken for analysis will be two games familiar to players around the world: Super Mario 
Bros. 3 and Mega Man 2. We will show how these two games are “polar opposites” 
and form a dialectic that runs through the whole genre. 
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We would like to not only approach the problem dialectically, but also in a materialist 
way. Therefore we will draw many ideas from a Lacanian and Marxist theoretical 
framework: these are not references which are usually used in relation to videogame 
studies, but since we are dealing with such canonical games, we believe concepts 
from these traditions can shed a very different light on the problem of defining 
videogame genres. We will begin with a key concept in Lacan’s contribution to a 
materialist theory of the subject: the Borromean knot. 
 
Preliminary Concepts 
It seems to be quite common for videogame scholars to mention the “ludologists vs. 
narratologists” debate. Seen from a distance, it concerns a polemic about videogame 
concepts unfolding on the philosophical front of this new field of studies. We certainly 
have no intention in trying to put an end to this debate – every field of knowledge has 
its founding myths, polemics and dialectics which develop slowly – but nevertheless 
there might be some contributions from the psychoanalytic perspective. The 
Symbolic and the Imaginary (not to mention the Real) are different registers, but they 
do not exclude each other in the Erfahrung (the experience) of the individual. 
Likewise the narrative and the ludus intermingle in the player experience. We will 
come back to that later on. 
Well, what exactly are these registers? Let’s begin with the Imaginary. 
When a six month old baby sees himself in the mirror, he is not yet “fully human” in 
the sense of being the “speaking animal”, but he can already identify (not recognize) 
himself. It is actually quite a sensation for the baby, since he gesticulates and is 
obviously content and curious. Joyful, the little one will suffer a double 
(mis)recognition (something Lacan, and Michel Pêcheux after him, call 
méconnaissance): first of all, there will be the alienation of the ego (the Imaginary is 
the realm of the ego) and, on top of that, there will be a concealment of this very 
alienation. So the child sees himself in the mirror and he will identify himself as more 
of a totality than he actually is; he will see himself as “more complete”.  
Of course it doesn’t have to be a real mirror, it can just as well be another child for 
instance or some other object. But what about becoming the “speaking animal”? Now 
that’s when it comes to the Other, the big Other with the capitalized “O”. When two 
humans are speaking, they do not understand each other “linearly”. We are not 
talking about circumlocutions or roundabout manners. It means that a simple 
sentence such as “Mario is an Italian plumber” is not understood by the listener as it 
is being said, but only afterwards in a retrograde way. The big Other is this “battery of 
signifiers” (in Lacan’s expression), guaranteeing the consistency of language. The 
symbolic Other is very different from the imaginary lower case other. It is the first that 
guarantees some degree of truth to human subjectivity. 
Through speech, I recognize the Other (…) as the very locus of truth (and of my 
truth), since it is actually necessary for me to call on him to witness the truth of 
my speech, even if I do this to lie to him and fool him. (…) the game of truth 
presupposes a law, a rule of the game (...) (Borch-Jacobsen 1991, p.117) 
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Although laws and rules are different in many dangerous ways, Borch-Jacobsen 
rightly attributes to the Other the capacity of witnessing the speech’s truth, even 
when “truth” is not the main concern. We can now draw a demarcation line that goes: 
in the Imaginary there is identification, in the Symbolic there is recognition. When the 
child enters the mirror stage (it corresponds roughly to Freud’s anal phase), he will 
set in motion a process that Lacan identifies with Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. 
Simply put, the master-slave dialectic is described in the Phenomenology of the 
Spirit, and it concerns the need to surpass mastery since the slave (who exists for 
the other) and the master (who exists for himself) would be two sides of the same 
consciousness. Such dialectic concerns a struggle between the master and the slave 
– each one is the other’s worst enemy – but the death of the one will be the death of 
the other. In here we find aggressiveness and narcissism. It would go beyond the 
scope of this article to discuss this at length, but we must point out the aspect of 
recognition involved when the subject enters the Symbolic. In a classic passage, 
Hegel writes that: “Self-Consciousness exists in-and-for-itself while (and because) it 
exists in-and-for-itself for-another; that is, it exists only as something recognized.” 
(Hegel, 1994, p.50) 
The myth of Narcissus is relevant here, since the Greek legend tells us that the 
beautiful youth fell in love with his mirror-like image seen on the lake; the image 
became master to a point where aggressiveness (in the form of his suicide) led to his 
real death. The Real, the third order in the Lacanian topology of the subject, is that 
which cannot be symbolized. It is before and beyond words – it is the place of 
trauma. It is also the order that threatens to return to the subject shattering his 
symbolic screen and flooding him with deadly jouissance, the paradoxical pleasure 
that leads to death. 
In a certain sense, jouissance could be understood as the object of a real desire, but 
that’s a bit of polite speculation. What really matters is that our desires are actually 
symbolic that we desire in relation to the Other’s desire: “man’s desire is the desire of 
the Other” (Lacan, 2001, p.292). We can never be quite sure of what the Other wants 
from us, so it is common for one to be left to stagger and stutter. The Other’s 
conundrum is an (en)jeu-des-mots, i.e., a game and a bet with words. We bet our 
way through desire with words, sometimes in a more or less dangerous way. 
Imaginary as the ego may be, it is the socio-symbolic Other that is the locus of the 
unconscious. That means that the unconscious is “outside” and it is also structured 
like a language. Through the influence of structuralists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss 
in anthropology and Roman Jakobson and Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics, 
Lacan developed the idea of a Symbolic order which is the register of language, the 
place where the subject is caught up in the web of signifiers, and consequently that 
the unconscious can be understood in linguistic terms. 
We have briefly mentioned the Borromean knot, a topological figure that represents 
in Lacanian epistemology the subject in its three orders: the Imaginary, the Symbolic 
and the Real. We should now turn to a bit of Lacanian semiotics since we’ll find the 
metaphoric and metonymic relations described and formalized in such a way that will 
come in handy when analyzing our platform games. 
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Lacanian Semiotics: Metaphor and Metonymy 
According to the classic definition of Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of modern 
linguistics, the sign is the composing element of language and it has two sides, like 
two sides of a sheet of paper: the signifier and the signified. The signifier would be 
the phonic component, and the signified would be the ideational element. This 
signifier/signified relation, according to Saussure, is arbitrary. 
By his turn, Lacan “turns Saussure upside down” (not unlike Marx with Hegel). The 
signifier has now priority since it produces the signified. 
Signifiers have a differential value, and no value “in-itself”, so language does not 
concern positive values. Contrary to Saussure, Lacan makes of signifiers the 
“building blocks” of language. Thus signifiers – which are not reduced only to words – 
are fundamentally articulated. Such units “are subjected to the double condition of 
being reducible to ultimate differential elements and combining them according to the 
laws of a closed order.” (Lacan 2001, p.116). 
As for the signified, according to Lacan it is an effect of the play of signifiers. “In other 
words, the signified is not given, but produced.” (Evans 1996, p.189) Again, the 
Marxist distinction between the producing basis of society and the produced super-
structure is not very far from the discussion here. We will now turn to two axes of 
analysis: the metaphor and the metonymy since these will be key concepts for our 
analysis. 
The Lacanian definition of metaphor is based on Jakobson’s distinction of metaphor 
as corresponding to the paradigmatic connection (relations in absentia) and 
metonymy to the syntagmatic connection (relations in praesentia).  
At the beginning of these preliminary concepts we mentioned briefly the “ludology vs 
narratology” debate. We would like to turn now to a materialist dialectic definition of 
narrative of our own which will be useful in the course of our analysis. 
 
Narrative 
I want to connect our concept of narrative for the purposes of this paper to an essay 
by German philosopher Walter Benjamin entitled The Storyteller (written in 1936). 
The storyteller is a figure that is now disappearing, states the text, since it is related 
to an artisanal work time. Modern industrial work and consequent reification, the 
impoverishment of experience through the abundance of fragmented ideological 
information and the calamitous effects of contemporary war contributed to the 
disappearance of the figure of the storyteller that Benjamin links in his essay to the 
Russian author Nikolai Leskov. Always in haste, modern man has not the languor 
(Langeweile) necessary to enjoy/engender narratives bearing the wisdom of an 
experience that could be transmitted. 
(…) characteristically, it is not only a man’s knowledge or wisdom, but above all 
his real life – and this is the stuff that stories are made of – which first assumes 
transmissible form at the moment of his death. (…) suddenly in his expressions 
and looks the unforgettable emerges, and imparts to everything that concerned 
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him that authority which even the poorest wretch in the act of dying possesses for 
the living around him. This authority lies at the very origin of the story. (Benjamin 
2003, p.151) 
We will thus define the concept of narrative in the following way: it is a symbolic 
predication of the Real. We will expand on this in the following. 
A mere imaginary predication of the Real would be, of course, ideology. But 
narratives speak qua the Other. Ideologies always work through a process of 
identification where alienation is concealed (suffice to remember the 
méconnaissance phenomenon). If we turn to Althusser’s productive discussion of 
ideology in his best-known essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (written 
in 1969) we will find such a structure with two characteristics. First, alienation will be 
kept out of sight, and secondly identification will turn the individual into a subject (the 
author plays with the double meaning of the word) for the ideology – Althusser 
condenses both these processes in the fertile concept of interpellation. According to 
the French theorist in a classic locus: 
We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects 
in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject, is speculary, i.e. a mirror-
structure, and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology, 
and ensures it's functioning. Which means that all ideology is centred, that the 
Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates 
around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connection 
such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject, while giving them in the Subject 
in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and future) the 
guarantee that this really concerns them and Him [...] (Althusser 1995, pp.134-
135) 
So we can make an operational definition of ideology as being an imaginary 
predication of the Real. But what about the narrative as symbolization? There is 
something every narrative must be if it is to ascend to the Symbolic – every narrative 
is an act. An act is not an activity, it is a way a free individual objectifies the big 
Other. With that we do not mean reification where there is only a symbolic 
justification of the Real, we mean an event where the Other is brought into being. Of 
course there is no reason why a narrative cannot also justify, as in reification, the 
Real, and there are plenty of such narratives all around us. 
Concerning the identity of the act and the Other, philosopher Slavoj Žižek writes that 
“an authentic act momentarily suspends the big Other, but it is simultaneously the 
‘vanishing mediator’ which grounds, brings into existence, the big Other.” (Žižek 
2007, p.144). Narration is always such an act. 
Narratives can be analyzed in terms of metonymy and metaphor.  
We are now ready to turn to two NES platform games which we believe to be the 
polar opposites of each other in the dialectic of the genre. We will apply the concepts 
mentioned here and, from the angle of narrative as we defined, relate both Super 
Mario Bros. 3 (SMB3) and Mega Man 2 (MM2) to each other as extreme translations 
of the concept of the NES platform game. 
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How to Press “Start” 
The first thing to do is not to ask about the “output” or the “ideological” – we have 
seen that our definition of narrative does not merely concern “representation” as if 
that could be external to the socio-symbolic field. 
Rather, the practical, physical, corporeal and tangible are to be the first locus of 
attention. In the vast majority of cases concerning videogames this means pushing 
buttons on a control.  
This is a table summing up the differences between the buttons in SMB3 and MM2 – 
for our purposes we will only consider A, B and Start. 
 
Button Super Mario Bros. 3 Megaman 2 
A Jump; fly; swim Jump 
B Run; carry; throw fireballs; 
throw hammers; use a tail 
whip 
Shoots arm cannon, metal 
blades, quick 
boomerang… 
START Pause Pause; go into change 
weapon screen 
 
Table 1: Button Description 
 
We will say that these buttons belong to the realm of the signifiers in these games. 
We can ascribe the visual and sound elements of these videogames to the field of 
the signified, which are produced by the signifiers. 
In SMB3 both the A and the B buttons are metaphorical. 
In MM2 the two metaphorical buttons are B and Start. The Start button is also 
metaphorical in a particular way: after each boss is defeated, the Start button 
acquires the new meaning of the capacity to select more weapons. 
Concerning only the three buttons – A, B and Start – in each game we can draw the 
following table: 




Button SMB3 MM2 
A Metaphorical Metonymical 
B Metaphorical Metaphorical 
Start Metonymical Metaphorical 
 
Table 2: Button Level: Metonymy and Metaphor 
 
In SMB3 the “Start” button is only used when the player wants to “turn away” from the 
game (curiously enough, Mario and the enemies disappear from the screen as if the 
player’s own reflection disappeared…). In MM2 the player steps back from the action 
and can change his tactics; the time itself of reflecting about the game must be taken 
into account. So in SMB3 the player reflects out of the game and in MM2 the player 
reflects inside the game.  
SMB3 is primarily imaginary and works through identification, and MM2 is primarily 
symbolic and works through recognition. 
Super Mario Bros. 3 brings to the player a fantasy world where princess Toadstool 
has been kidnapped by the evil dragon Bowser. The player must assume the role of 
Mario to restore order in the eight kingdoms of the game. In each kingdom the ruler 
has been transformed into an animal by Bowser’s children and so Mario must 
recover the magic wand from each world’s “boss” and turn the king back into his old 
form until the final duel with Bowser. 
Mega Man 2, on the other hand, is set in the year 200X (the game was released in 
Japan in 1988) when an army of robots, led by eight robot masters are created by the 
evil Dr. Wily. The player assumes the role of Mega Man, a robot created by Dr. Light. 
Mega Man must crush each robot master, incorporating their weapons to his arsenal, 
and defeat Dr. Wily. 
Mario’s progression through the eight kingdoms is metonymic, even if he can choose 
certain routes or “skip” certain kingdoms (using the magic flute for instance). Mega 
Man’s relation to the robot masters’ stages is clearly metaphoric. Each one of them 
has a weakness (Wood Man’s leaf shield is powerful against Air Man for instance) 
and so choosing the order to play the levels is a crucial part of the strategy. 
Another reason for MM2’s robot masters’ stages being metaphoric is that each boss 
confers Mega Man their characteristic weapon. If there were anthropophagic 
cannibals that ate their enemies believing they would absorb their powers, here we 
can speak of something of a “robophagy”. But what really matters is that the weapon 
is the condensation of the robot master’s stage. In SMB3’s kingdoms, on the other 
hand, the bosses allow Mario to return the kings to their former self through a fetish. 
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After restoring the order in the kingdom, Mario receives a letter from the princess, 
where he reads her displacement (a magic item in the place of the princess). 
In the “big picture”, SMB3 is the narrative of an object (the princess) that is taken 
away and is retrieved. Freud describes his 18 months old grandson Ernst playing 
with a reel that had a piece of string, tossing it to where it could not be seen and 
pulling it back, meanwhile exclaiming “Fort!” (Gone) and “Da!” (There), a typical case 
of repetition in childhood not strange to the structure of SMB3. 
Meanwhile MM2 is a recognition narrative. In MM2 the intro states that: “Dr. Light 
created Mega Man to stop the evil desires of Dr. Wily” (emphasis added). Mega Man 
confronts Dr. Wily – nothing has been lost, but there is the threat of destruction. So 
Mega Man is in relation to two asymmetric desires: Dr. Wily’s, which are evil and 
must be thwarted, and Dr. Light’s, a father figure incorporated into the fabric of the 
game since he develops special weapons for Mega Man.  
The fact that MM2 is a recognition narrative is particularly clear in the game’s end: 
Dr. Wily’s holographic projection (the last vestige of the Imaginary) is defeated and 
Dr. Wily begs for mercy – Mega Man spares him. In the end of SMB3 on the other 
hand the princess jokes about the princess being yet “in another castle”, as if the 
Imaginary turned back on the player to threaten with an endless flight from the hic et 
nunc in a labyrinth of mirrors. 
We can again relate these three levels to metaphor and metonym by drawing a table: 
 
Level SMB3 MM2 
Kingdom/Robot Master Metonymic Metaphorical 
Magic Item/Weapon Metonymic Metaphorical 
Ending Metaphorical Metonymic 
 
Table 3: Game Levels: Metonymy and Metaphor 
 
As we can see, on a first glance SMB3 and MM2 seem very similar: one set in the 
mythical time, the other in a sci-fi future, but both a story of good versus evil. Their 
controls (Table 1) also seem to share many characteristics. However, deepening the 
analysis, we find that their control buttons have different narrative functions (Table 2) 
and that the super-structural game levels (Table 3) are actually opposite to each 
other. 
On the “Game Level”, the realm of the signifieds, we have seen that SMB3 and MM2 
are dialectical opposites and on the realm of the signifier, on the “Button Level”, there 
are some things that are different and others that remain the same. This will allow us 
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to define the NES platform genre: they are games where there is at least one 
metaphorical non-jump button. 
 
Conclusion 
We read with great interest Dominic Arsenault’s article on Video Game Genre, 
Evolution and Innovation in the Eludamos: Journal for Computer Game Culture 
(2009). The author questions the concept of genre that is taken for granted in most 
researches in the field of videogame studies and analyzes, within his own theoretical 
framework, the first person shooter. In a key passage in his conclusion, Arsenault 
relates mechanics, design, play-experience and history in the following way: 
“From the production side of the business, then, video game genre can be 
understood as the codified usage of particular mechanics and game design 
patterns to express a range of intended play-experiences. In this respect, 
charting the history of a video game genre requires one to go beyond the ‘laundry 
list’ of mechanics (…) and investigate the history of the general play-experience 
of which the particular mechanics are only one possible materialization. (…)” 
(Arsenault 2009, p.171) 
We have also tackled the NES platform genre through the way signifiers produce 
signifieds. Although videogame scholars may be fond of the “game mechanics vs. 
game dynamics” opposition, we believe it to be lacking a true dialectical dimension, 
being no more than a dichotomy.  
When Arsenault proposes the diachronic investigation of “play-experience” of which 
the “mechanics” would be “one possible materialization”, there is from our 
perspective an inversion of the real process. It is “mechanics” that allows for “one 
possible materialization” of “play-experience” but this “mechanics” is always-already 
decided by the industry, “from above”. With the exception of social disposition 
(capitalism, the videogame industry existing inside a society divided into classes) the 
videogame industry and what it believes should or should not be designed have as 
its aim the maximum profit (“business”). But nothing – absolutely nothing – in the 
creative possibilities of videogame itself prevents game producers from making a 
“James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake” or a “Heidegger’s Being and Time” as a NES 8-bit 
platform game. The fact is that videogame industry – its specificities from, say, the 
music industry and the film industry have to be more studied from a sociological point 
of view –  has little interest in anything but that which appeals to the biggest possible 
masses. The result is that videogame apparatuses exhibit a huge gap from the 
technological capacities to what they are used to deliver. 
To study the world in terms of its dialectical contradictions does not mean to study 
that which is given, but to try to understand also its possibilities. Arsenault’s study of 
video game genres is certainly very useful for further research, but in the sense that it 
limits itself to studying “reality” without its possibilities, it remains historicist and not 
truly historical. To study the French Revolution for instance is not to list all its events, 
but to question what lied in potentia in each act. In a sense, to use a videogame 
image, Arsenault is adopting a Super Mario Bros. 3 way of looking at things, and 
we’re proposing more of a Mega Man 2-like reading of videogames in general. 
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Recently there have been some interesting games made with an “artistic” aim. It 
would go beyond the scope of this article to investigate these “indie games”, but 
perhaps we can quote names such as Ian Bogost and Jason Rohrer since they 
already signal a trend in videogame making, if not in the videogame industry. 
Perhaps they are a part of a growing movement that will pose an alternative to the 
videogame industry monopolistic practices; however, one should not forget that it is 
impossible, from our Lacanian-Marxist perspective, to change videogame practices, 
to “reform” them without changing the world where they exist.  
A game such as Killzone 2 is supposed to have had a budget of 45 million US 
dollars, and it consists basically of people shooting people. It is not that there is 
necessarily any problem with the representation of shooting people, it is just that 
when one thinks about the colossal effort put into it and the aesthetic output, one 
begins to wonder if a twenty-first century creative technology such as videogame is 
not being managed with a nineteenth century factory mentality. 
The videogame is a cultural item that belongs, from its very birth, to the cultural 
industry. In this context it is this author’s opinion that game designers should pay 
critical attention to the “ludologists vs. narratologists” and “game design vs. game 
mechanics” dichotomies because of the political tones they can acquire.  
To study an object scientifically does not mean taking a neutral stance on it. 
Videogame studies can and should provide elements that go beyond the scope of the 
immediate and furnish videogame designers with the critical tools to think and 
practice their art. 
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